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Abstract 
The European Convention, set up by the Heads of state and governments during the Laeken Summit of 
December 2001, was presented by its initiators as a means of strengthening the legitimacy of the EU. Is 
this a rhetorical argument of politicians, which could be explained by the intense electoral cycle of 2002-
2004? Or is there something, in the process of the Convention, that could change the nature of the EU 
constitution? 
 
This paper argues that the Convention is not likely to transform the nature of the EU. The arguments put 
forward by its members, and the partial compromises reached at this stage, show that the conventionnels 
are willing to rationalize the acquis, rather than launch a new phase of integration; this Convention will 
not be remembered as a European Philadelphia.  
 
I then turn to the process of the Convention in order to assess its potential effect in terms of legitimation of 
the EU. I argue that the EU’s alleged “democratic deficit” is merely a problem of standards: though the 
EU can be seen as a fully accountable and legitimate polity in Madisonian terms (Moravcsik), it is still 
seen as an unsatisfying arrangement when interpreted in more demanding “republican” terms (Habermas). 
This is the reason why the Convention might be useful: if it managed to reduce cognitive and normative 
dissonance, it could help soften conflicts of interpretation of the nature of the EU among leaders. 
Moreover, by clarifying the role of the EU, it could reduce public expectations and the frustrations they 
engender.  
 
I conclude that the Convention is an exercise of reappraisal and confirmation of the EU’s founding pact, 
but that even this rather modest role is important in terms of legitimacy because of the nature of the EU 
constitutional process: since the existing treaties are the result of a long piecemeal and instrumental 
process of bargaining among member states, the EU lacks clear and accepted normative foundations. Even 
if it only clarifies and confirms the status quo, the Convention, and the public debates to which the 
ratification of the treaty might give rise after the IGC, might help root the  EU’s founding pact in the 
public’s conscience.   3
 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty at the beginning of the 1990s, the problem of the 
EU’s “democratic legitimacy” has been one of the most discussed aspects of European integra-
tion, both in academia and in the real world. The Laeken Declaration, giving birth to the Conven-
tion on the Future of the Union, bears witness to this widespread public preoccupation when it 
presents the question of democratic legitimacy as ”the first challenge facing Europe.” The crea-
tion of the Convention itself, conceived as a broad and open body, is supposed to be an element 
of answer to this challenge; the questions its members are asked to discuss cover a broad range of 
subjects, but all of them are said to be related to the EU’s democratic ambition; the plenary ses-
sions of the Convention confirm that its members pay tribute – or at least pretend to pay tribute – 
to this objective: most of their interventions are based on the argument that the reform they sup-
port is connected to democratic intentions. 
Despite (or because) of the consensus on the importance of the question, the mission of the 
Convention is a very difficult one. Giving an answer to the question of what a “democratic Un-
ion” could be indeed supposes an agreement on the meaning of democracy and on the nature of 
the EU. Ten years of discussions on these two controversial questions have shown that conflicts 
of interpretations among European leaders and public opinion remain very deep. In order to reach 
its purpose, the Convention will have to reduce this dissonance, and to forge a common under-
standing, not only among leaders but also among the general public, of these basic constitutional 
principles. 
In the first section of this paper, I briefly recall the conflict of interpretations over the EU’s de-
mocratic legitimacy and argue that the EU is more than a simple “modus vivendi” but its basic 
rules are more controversial than those of a “constitutional consensus” defined in Rawls’s terms. I 
will then, in the second part, focus on the process of the Convention and argue that its delibera-
tive nature might be a (modest) contribution to the democratic legitimation of the European Un-
ion. In the last section, I examine the likely outcome of the Convention, in terms of policies and 
institutions, and underline the aspect of the present conflicts of interpretation that it will probably 
not be able to solve. I nevertheless conclude that the EU can live with these ambiguities, and that 
its legitimacy will be strengthened if the Convention manages to forge a consensus on some for-
mal core issues.   4
 
I.  The conflict of standards 
One of the reasons why the debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy remains so lively is that 
the diagnosis of the different actors and scholars, and the suggestions they made, are based on 
different assumptions, which are rarely made clear.
2 In this continuous controversy, scholars clas-
sically distinguish five different vectors of legitimation.
3 
 
Indirect legitimacy 
According to this notion, the legitimacy of the European Union can at best be indirect or deri-
vative. It depends on the legitimacy of its component states, its respect for their sovereignty, and 
its ability to serve their purposes. Supported by the German Constitutional Court in its famous 
decision on the Maastricht treaty, this argument is the leitmotiv of those who, within and outside 
the Convention, defend an intergovernmental vision of the Union. In the academic literature, this 
rationalist assumption is also associated with principal-agent models, according to which any 
autonomy of Union institutions is not evidence of their independent legitimacy, but of where it 
suits states to confer limited discretion on a supranational agent, according to a contract that is 
contingent, calculated and controlled. 
According to this argument, the EU would be a democratic polity if its competences were de-
fined in strict terms and if national parliaments were given the opportunity to control the action of 
their governments acting in the Council and the growth of EU competences. 
 
Federal legitimacy 
A second classic view is that the Union can only be democratic if it follows the traditional de-
vices of federalism. Constantly defended by the Commission, by the majority of the EP since its 
direct election in 1979, as well as by Germany and the Benelux countries, and recently advocated 
by Jürgen Habermas (2001), this argument is based on an orthodox Madisonian reasoning. A pol-
ity that is territorially segmented, yet focused on the management of problems that cut across 
those sub-units, will require representative structures that can aggregate and deliberate on prefer-
ences both nationally and transnationally. The need for dual legitimation might also be justified 
by the classic argument for mixed government. If it is unlikely that rational citizens will consent 
for long to systems of rule that expose them to risks of arbitrary domination, a legitimate Union 
                                                           
2Craig 1999   5
cannot afford to concentrate power, whether in a club of governments or in a parliamentary ma-
jority, but must, instead, institutionalize checks and balances between the carriers of those two 
legitimacy claims.  
Practically, the advocates of this federal vision support the authority of the Commission and 
the powers of the European Parliament as counterweights to the international nature of the Coun-
cil. They tend to see the Commission as a federal government, that should be personalized to help 
citizens perceive the issues of EU politics. 
 
Technocratic Legitimacy 
According to this perspective, the EU is legitimated as an “independent fourth branch of gov-
ernment.”
4 This position implies the following: first, a normative belief that the superior ability of 
a system to meet citizen needs is grounds for political obligation to it; second, epistemological 
confidence in a rationality or science of government (positivism); and, third the identification of 
specific public needs that can only be met by independent European institutions.  
Though this argument is rarely voiced as such in the political arena, and never presented as a 
comprehensive doctrine of legitimacy, it underlies the status of the European Central Bank and of 
other agencies, including the Commission in some of its tasks. 
  
Procedural Legitimacy 
Though it can be seen as a vector in itself, procedural legitimacy is often presented in the EU 
literature as a means of filling a gap in technocratic legitimacy. In response to criticisms that in-
dependent technocratic agencies are means of escaping democratic controls, some authors have 
defended a procedural conception, according to which the legitimacy of an action rests in its ob-
servance of certain formal procedures: transparency, motivation, balance of interests, evaluation, 
participation of stakeholders and so on.
5 Moreover, from this formal point of view, what gives the 
Union legal legitimacy is not just its attentiveness to due process, but also its capacity to generate 
an original normative order that confers new rights and entitlements on citizens, enforceable even 
against states themselves.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
3 This section is based on (Lord and Magnette 2000). 
4 Majone, 1996 
5 Majone, 2001   6
 
Corporate legitimacy 
Another way of securing the legitimacy of a policy is by negotiating it directly with those 
whose compliance it needs. Such an approach may confer legitimacy where it is generally ac-
cepted that those exposed to the concentrated effects of public policy should have special rights 
of consultation in the decision-making process. Although the corporatist ideas that lay, for exam-
ple, behind the creation of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) have little purchase on 
contemporary economy and society, the Commission has sought new ways of identifying those 
affected by its policies and including them in their design (Magnette 2003). 
By way of summary, it is useful to show how each vector of legitimacy implies its own dis-
tinct account of what is needed to make the EU legitimate on the input and output sides of gov-
ernance.
6 In the case of indirect legitimacy, authorisation by Member States and the delivery of 
state preferences are the sources of input and output legitimacy respectively. In that of federal 
legitimacy, elections provide input legitimacy and the delivery of voter preferences secures out-
put legitimacy. In the case of technocratic legitimacy expertise and delivery of efficiency are the 
key inputs and outputs. In that of procedural legitimacy, due process is a source of input legiti-
macy, whilst output legitimacy is constituted by the delivery of rights. Under corporate legiti-
macy consultation and compliance of organized actors are indicators of input and output legiti-
macy respectively.  
 
Input and output legitimacy under the five vectors 
 
Vectors of legitimation  Input 
 
Output 
Indirect  Authorisation State  preference 
Federal  Elections Voters’  preference 
Technocratic  Expertise Efficiency 
Procedural  Due process  Rights and remedies 
Corporate  Consultation Compliance 
 
                                                           
6 Scharpf 1998   7
These should not be understood as full-fledged doctrines but as ideal-type elements of neces-
sarily composite conceptions of legitimacy. Some actors defend one and only one of these ele-
ments – as do the rare purest advocates of national sovereignty or of European federalism – but 
most actors and scholars refer, explicitly or not, to several of these elements of legitimation. Ma-
jone, for example, typically combines technocratic and procedural vectors.  
The purpose of this typology is simply to recall that the problem of the Convention is to find a 
combination of these vectors that could be acceptable to a quasi-unanimity of its members, and to 
the largest segments of public opinions. As scholars, we can argue that the EU is objectively an 
efficient international organisation, and that as such it is democratic because it is controlled by its 
member states and because the non-majoritarian institutions they have set up are submitted to 
strict mechanisms of accountability.
7 However, if this rational argument is not accepted by politi-
cal leaders and public opinion, because their vision is based on other cognitive and normative 
frameworks, the EU’s democratic legitimacy will remain weak. The contribution the Convention 
might give to the legitimation of the EU depends on its capacity to reduce the scope and depth of 
these conflicts of interpretation, by finding a combination of the vectors which is largely accept-
able. Theoretically, at least three types of combination can be envisaged.  
 
i)  First, the members of the Convention could reach an ambivalent agreement, i.e. an 
agreement on some basic rules based on misunderstanding. The policy preferences of 
the actors are indeed derived from their fundamental principles and from their beliefs 
about ends-means relations. In some cases, this can lead to an agreement “based on 
preference differences and belief differences that cancel each other”;
8 the decision to 
reject bicameralism in the French Assemblée constituante can be understood in these 
terms.
9 In the EU, the definition of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht treaty 
offers an example of this mechanism: some member states thought this principle would 
limit the growth of EU powers, while others hoped it could be used to launch new poli-
cies. Because they disagreed on the “finality” of the Union and on the likely effect of 
the principle of subsidiarity, they could agree on the principle itself.  
                                                           
7 Moravcsik 2002 
8 Elster 1998 
9 Elster 1994   8
This kind of ambiguous creativity however faces two limits. First, an agreement of this 
kind is possible on some key elements of a constitutional treaty, but not on the whole 
text: in some instances, dissonance reduction will clarify the nature of the disagreement 
and make ambivalent solutions impossible. Secondly, this is always a precarious com-
promise: the continuous controversy on the extent of the EU’s tasks after Maastricht, 
and the legal/political debate on the nature of the principle of subsidiarity revealed the 
weakness of the agreement and called for further negotiation.  
 
ii)  More often than not, bargaining on the rules of the game will lead to a modus vivendi 
between member states. In Rawls’s theory of political constructivism, this is the first 
step of the process leading to the formation of a well-ordered democratic society.
10 A 
modus vivendi can be forged when the parties realize that there is no other viable solu-
tion, though their fundamental principles remain irreconcilable. To illustrate this case, 
Rawls gives the example of the agreement between Catholics and Protestants on the 
principle of tolerance in the sixteenth century: the two opposite camps agreed on this 
principle, not because they shared moral conceptions of the nature of the individual and 
of the society, but because they knew that they could not defeat the other party. As 
soon as the relative strength of one camp would give it a strategic advantage, it would 
reject the principle. As the agreement did not include a shared perception of the princi-
ples on which it was based, it was not stable. 
Again, the initial pact between the member states can be seen as a modus vivendi. The 
logic of bargaining produced an aggregation of preferences that was supported by the 
member states as long as it was coherent with their interest, but challenged when they 
thought it limited their gains – the crisis of 1965 could be understood in these terms. 
Given its weakness – its subordination to the circumstances and to the relative strength 
of the actors – this kind of agreement cannot stabilize a well-ordered society by its 
own. 
 
iii)  Rawls argues that this modus vivendi can be the basis of a deeper, larger and more pre-
cise agreement – his famous “overlapping consensus.” Rawls distinguishes two de-
grees in this process. First, under certain conditions, a modus vivendi can be gradually 
                                                           
10 Rawls 1993: IV, §3   9
transformed into a “constitutional consensus”
11: this occurs when the parties agree on 
some democratic procedures to solve their conflicts, but do not necessarily agree on a 
shared conception of the citizen and the society. Three conditions are required to reach 
this kind of consensus, according to Rawls: a) a clear definition of the basic rights and 
freedoms, which places them beyond political conflict; b) the acceptance of a form of 
public reason, coherent with common sense, and necessary to apply these principles; c) 
the rise of cooperative virtues in politics – such as the sense of moderation and equity, 
and the spirit of compromise – which are themselves encouraged by the existence of 
the institutions and their practice. In a second stage, an overlapping consensus can be 
built on this basis:
12 acting in this framework, the parties tend to modify their compre-
hensive doctrines under the effect of a practice channelled by the constitutional consen-
sus. The political practice, based on this proceduralized discussion, will gradually 
strengthen the consensus. It will become deeper (encapsulating a political conception 
of justice), larger (defining basic laws guaranteeing these principles), and more precise 
(narrowing the range of liberal conceptions defended by the citizens). All this should, 
through political cooperation, strengthen the sense of trust on which the society is 
based. 
Given the absence of strong mechanisms of interpersonal and international solidarity in 
the EU, it cannot be seen as a society based on a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus.” It 
is not even sure that its basic treaties can be described as a “constitutional consensus.” 
Some could argue that the European Union had already reached this procedural con-
sensus before the creation of the Convention. The adoption of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights in December 2000 responds to Rawls’s first condition; in a sense, the 
long practice of cooperation has produced key elements of a common language, and of 
cooperative behavior. One could also say, however, that the creation of this body by 
the Heads of State and Government bears witness to the fact that they acknowledged 
the limits of the existing consensus. Their discourse on the method of the Convention 
is based on the argument that intergovernmental bargaining is, by its very nature, un-
able to go beyond a modus vivendi – or an imperfect constitutional contract; the raison 
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d’être of the Convention, as stated by its creators, is specifically to reach a deeper, lar-
ger and more precise agreement.  
 
II.  The process : (moderate) Kantian optimism 
To what extent should a constitution strengthen the consensus, and how far should it preserve 
the conflicts which are the basis of democratic politics? This question cannot be given a straight-
forward answer in constitutional theory.
13 Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus is neces-
sary. But Habermas finds this kind of agreement too weak and too fragile: if the members only 
agree on the rules, but continue to disagree on the foundations of these rules, the constitution 
lacks a common understanding and remains subject to permanent divisions. However, the two au-
thors agree on at least one core principle: the consensus must be built through public deliberation, 
not through secret bargaining.  
The analytical (and normative) distinction between the deliberative and bargaining modes of 
conflict-resolution has become very fashionable in political science in the last ten years. Very 
schematically, this distinction can be summarized in these terms:  
i)  bargaining is usually defined, in the widely accepted terms of social choice theory, as a 
process between a) actors with stable preferences, b) who try to maximize their bene-
fits, c) through exchanges of concessions.  
ii)  by contrast, the advocates of deliberation argue that this process takes place among a) 
actors who are ready to change their preferences, b) when they are convinced by ra-
tional arguments, c) in order to reach “common goods.”
14  
This distinction is based on both analytical and normative grounds. From an analytical point of 
view, the advocates of deliberation assume that the outcome of the process may be explained by 
its rules and by the non-utilitarian aims of the actors. From a normative point of view, inspired by 
neo-Kantian perspectives, this praxis is said to be superior to negotiation. In terms of efficiency, 
it is supposed to produce “integrative” results which go beyond the smallest common denomina-
tor. In terms of legitimacy, it pretends to build more solid and better accepted solutions. After 
having argued, the actors not only agree on a norm but also on its justification.
15 Those who have 
not won at least have the satisfaction of having been heard, and do know why they have lost. The 
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14 Elster 1998; Dryzek 2000 
15 Habermas 1996   11
foundations of the agreement being clearer, later conflicts on the basic norms are less likely to 
occur. Moreover, if deliberation takes place in an open forum, ordinary citizens are given the op-
portunity to understand the raison d’être of the norms, and should therefore accept them more 
easily.
16 For these reasons, constitutional assemblies are often described as privileged sites of 
deliberation.
17  
It is difficult, when looking at the European Convention, not to notice that its creators and its 
members are deeply imbued with such an idealized definition of deliberation.  
i)  the reasons given by those who advocated the creation of this preparatory body clearly 
refer to this opposition. The classic argument – that can be found in the EP’s report, in 
the Commission’s positions, in the discourses of the Belgian Presidency and its Bene-
lux partners – is based on the contrast between the inefficiency and lack of legitimacy 
of the IGC method, illustrated by the Nice Summit, and the promises of a broader and 
more open Convention – of which the first Convention gave an example; 
ii)  the mandate defined by the Heads of State and Governments in the Laeken Declaration 
incorporates some basic elements of a “deliberative setting.”
18 True, the fact that the 
Convention will be followed by a classic IGC, and that during its works it will be influ-
enced by the governments from inside – through their representatives – and from out-
side – through the dialogue between its Chairman and the European Council – con-
firms that the praxis of bargaining remains crucial.
19 But the deliberative potential of 
the mandate defined at Laeken should not be neglected. First, the publicity of the de-
bates could force the governments to justify publicly their positions
20 – some of them 
may have thought that this would actually give them the opportunity to demonstrate 
that their traditional reluctance is not based on a narrow defence of national interests or 
                                                           
16 Manin 1998 
17 Elster 1998 
18 Elster 1998 
19 The geographic and political balance of the Presidium also corresponds to a classic intergovernmental logic. The 
fact that the Secretariat of the Convention is provided by the General Secretariat of the Council is another sign of this 
classic pattern. 
The non-decisional nature of the Convention is neatly affirmed in the Laeken Declaration: the text says that “it will 
be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the Union’s future development and try to 
identify the various possible options”; the final document is said to “provide a starting point for discussions in the 
Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions” (emphasis added). 
20 Theories of deliberation show that the principle of publicity can have perverse effects, in that the actors may be 
tempted to use rhetoric to convince the external audience (Elster 1998). But this does not occur in a Convention 
which is largely ignored by the general public.    12
on prejudices, but on pragmatic reasoning. Second, as all members states have been 
given the same number of representatives, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
to vote in such an assembly: in the absence of a system of weighted votes, a majority 
could represent a very small minority of the European population. The Convention was 
thus condemned to agree by consensus, rendering the use of vetoes, blocking minori-
ties or winning coalitions very difficult. This, in turn, could preserve the fluidity of the 
assembly and, without preventing it, limit the resurgence of practices of bargaining. 
Finally, the fluidity of the body is also encouraged by its mixed composition: in an as-
sembly composed of representatives of the national governments and parliaments – in-
cluding those of the candidate countries – as well as MEPs and members of the Com-
mission, the classic dividing lines of intergovernmental negotiations could be over-
come by new, more flexible and unforeseen coalitions. All this had been, moreover, 
illustrated by the experience of the Convention that had written the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights;
21 governments could not say they were unaware of these potential ef-
fects of the rules they had defined. And they knew that all Conventions, in the history 
of modern politics, have always escaped their creators. 
iii)  the discourse of the conventionnels pays tribute to this “deliberative spirit.” Just to take 
one example, in his introductory speech, President Giscard invited the members to 
“embark on our task without preconceived ideas, and form our vision of the new 
Europe by listening constantly and closely to all our partners.” Taking this further, he 
added that “the members of the four components of our Convention must not regard 
themselves simply as spokespersons for those who appointed them” and that even if 
each member would remain “loyal to his or her brief,” he or she also had to “make his 
or her personal contribution .”
22 This is, he argued, the key of the “Convention spirit.” 
Paraphrasing the ideal-type definition of deliberation, he concluded: “If your contribu-
                                                           
21 Braibant 2001; Deloche-Gaudez 2001 
22 Inaugural speech, pp. 8 et 13. He added during a press conference that the term “representative” was a “erreur de 
rédaction” since “ce ne sont pas des représentants, lorsqu’ils parlent, ils ne disent pas parler au nom de l’une ou 
l’autre composante,” Agence Europe, 28 March 2002, p. 6. Jose Maria Aznar, as President of the European Council 
had on the contrary argued that the members had to follow the views of the organs they represented. In his speech to 
the Inaugural session, Aznar however insisted on the virtues of deliberation, on behalf of the European Council: 
transmitting the opinion of the quasi-unanimity of the members of the European Council, he argued that “Nice is the 
reason why we are here today.” Partly rewriting the history, he added that “Immediately thereafter, the Heads of 
State and Governments convened the Convention that is starting now, in the knowledge that the new stage calls for 
new forms of operation and deliberation in order to continue to create ‘more Europe” (emphasis added).   13
tions genuinely seek to prepare a consensus, and if you take account of the proposals 
and comments made by the other members of the Convention, then the content of the 
final consensus can be worked out step by step here within the Convention.” This, he 
added, is the crucial difference between the Convention and a classic IGC, which he 
defined as “an arena for diplomatic negotiations between Member States in which each 
party sought legitimately to maximize its gains without regard for the overall pic-
ture,”
23 paraphrasing, this time, the classic definition of bargaining.
24 Giscard’s rhetoric 
is not an isolated example. Most members of the Convention, and the members of the 
European Council themselves, have underlined these “promises” of deliberation in 
their comments on the Convention method. 
 
The weight of this “deliberative ideal” is important in terms of democratic legitimacy. What-
ever may be the result of the Convention, it confirms that, in this phase of European integration 
dominated by discussions on the institutional framework rather than on the policies of the Union, 
ideas and ideologies become ever more important.
25 Setting up the Convention was, in itself, a 
strategy of democratic legitimation, and this is probably one of the reasons why those countries 
who were not enthusiastic about this idea nevertheless accepted it.
26  
                                                           
23 Speech, p. 13. In the same vein, see his opinion published by Le Monde on 23 July 2002: “Il ne s’agit pas de 
rouvrir, de manière précipitée, d’anciens débats, comme la querelle entre fédéralistes et intergouvernementalistes, ou 
la rivalité entre la Commission et le Conseil, qui se sont brisés sur les écueils d’Amsterdam et de Nice, mais de faire 
avancer le groupe pour vérifier s’il peut découvrir, en fin de parcours, une solution globale commune.”  
24 In a press conference after the session of 22 March, Giscard said he found it “normal que les grandes sensibilités 
européennes harmonisent leurs points de vue” while however warning against any “structuration excessive” of the 
Convention. (Agence Europe, 23 March 2002). On 12 July, after many members had presented their argument as 
their state’s position, he recalled ‘qu’il ne s’agira pas de s’exprimer d’un point de vue national (…). Nous attendons 
des conventionnels une expression européenne” (p. 12). In his opinion published by Le Monde on 23 July 2002, he 
said about the representatives of the governments: “Leur situation comporte une certaine ambiguïté: participent-ils en 
tant que personne aux travaux et aux interrogations de la Convention, ou viennent-ils y exprimer le point de vue des 
gouvernements qui les ont désignés? Après un premier flottement, il m’a semblé que leur caractère de 
‘conventionnel’ s’affirmait.”  
25 Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis 1998 
26 It remains difficult to assert why Britain and Denmark, who had been surprised and annoyed by the first Con-
vention, have accepted this process. One hypothesis is that the Belgian presidency, presenting this initiative as one 
element of a broader debate, reduced its importance and made it acceptable. But the representatives of these member 
states were probably not so naïve – and if they were, they will not acknowledge this in interviews. Another 
hypothesis is that these countries found it difficult to refuse a Convention and thought it more efficient to try and 
control it – hence their strategy to amend the Laeken Declaration and open new questions, their insistence on the 
non-decisional nature of this body and their willingness to integrate candidate countries, supposed to be less prone to 
support further integration. If this hypothesis is right, as I believe it is, it means that these countries acknowledged 
the need to set up a process inspired by a democratic constitutional tradition.   14
True, the creation of the Convention does not guarantee, in itself, that an answer will be given 
to the “democratic challenge facing Europe.” On the contrary, if it did not manage to produce a 
text widely accepted and understood as “more democratic” than the former treaties, it would 
deepen the EU’s democratic deficit.
27 The question is thus: will the process matter? will the Con-
vention be able to produce a “constitutional consensus” that will stabilize the Union? will citizens 
find it more legitimate because it was written by a deliberative body ?  
This kind of questions cannot be given satisfying empirical answers. First, because we will 
never know what the outcome of the IGC would have been if the Convention had not existed, and 
it will be very difficult to demonstrate that the final compromise was forged through deliberations 
rather than through the negotiations between Heads of State and Government taking place in 
parallel. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that, within an IGC, actors argue and sometimes alter 
their preferences after having heard arguments. If this could be demonstrated (and it probably 
could), this would weaken the analytical distinction between bargaining and deliberation. These 
methodological biases imply that when the Convention has concluded its work, we will be able to 
compare its outcome to the status quo ante, but not to compare deliberative and bargaining proc-
esses. Secondly, it is nearly impossible to assert when and how the actors changed their mind 
because of the arguments put forward in the deliberative process. Finally, measuring the changes 
of perceptions in public opinion requires sophisticated methodologies which are subject to many 
biases.
28  
Examining the work of the Convention, we could argue that, in many aspects, deliberation 
works. Its members are organized in political groups, components and sometimes national dele-
gations, but they rarely state it. As they try to combine these three forms of membership, they 
tend to escape constraints: to be a “good liberal” one may have to abandon the “British line”; as 
an MEP, a Conservative conventionnel can have an opinion which is remote from the official line 
of the Conservative party, and so on. In other terms, “multiple constraints” can strengthen the 
autonomy of the actors, who can use a constraint as a pretext for escaping another constraint. 
Moreover, the complexity of the Convention is such that, as a body, it is much more fluid than an 
                                                           
27 From a formal point of view, as its members were not explicitly elected by the citizens of the member states to 
write a European constitution, the Convention remains less democratic than a national constitutional assembly.  
28 In Fishkin’s experiences, the same sample is questioned before and after the deliberative process to measure this 
change (Fishkin 1995). Given that, as far as I know, no systematic polls were made before the Convention on these 
issues, comparison will be difficult  : moreover, Eurobarometers are often criticized for not being immune to 
misinterpretations due to cultural diversity and the small size of the samples.    15
IGC. Agreements are built on oscillating and composite coalitions between a large number of 
small factions, and we have known since Madison that this weakens the veto of the larger fac-
tions. Publicity is also important in the Convention. Even if the members negotiate outside the 
Convention, their compromise can only be endorsed by the Convention after it has been publicly 
debated. Some members have strengthened the role of the plenaries, when they used them to an-
nounce and explain a shift in the position of their government – as Peter Hain did when he said 
“he” (meaning Blair’s government) was ready to accept the incorporation of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights in the Treaty.  
At this stage of the Convention, however, it remains difficult if not impossible to draw definite 
conclusions. We are condemned to hypothesis and general remarks. I first would like to underline 
a paradox of deliberation which, as far as I know, has not been clearly analyzed by theorists of 
deliberation. This paradox concerns the relation between the two promises of deliberation. On the 
one hand, this practice is said to be more efficient than bargaining, because it produces disso-
nance reduction and mutual understanding, and legitimizes the attitude of those who change their 
mind, so that its outcome can be superior to the smallest common denominator. In practice, these 
dynamics are facilitated by the formation, among the actors of deliberation, of a “common lan-
guage” and shared cognitive and normative frameworks. The European Convention illustrates 
this phenomenon. After a period of “listening” dominated by vague rhetoric, the conventionnels 
have opted for pragmatic reasoning,
29 and molded their arguments around the legal and technical 
terms of the eurojargon. This might help them reach a consensus, as conflicts based on misunder-
standing and passions are reduced.
30 But this also tends to weaken the “external promise” of 
deliberation. When debates are cast in technical terms, deprived of passionate rhetoric and remote 
from the citizen’s common sense, they do not draw the attention of the general public and do not 
help citizens understand the issues at stake. The fact that the Convention has been largely ignored 
by the European press, and the absence of public debate outside the small circles of “European-
ized” citizens – not to mention the comedy of the “Forum” – are clear illustrations of the limit 
placed on this “public” deliberation. 
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It should not be forgotten, however, that most constitutional deliberations in history were only 
debated during the ratification process, after the end of the Convention itself. The French Assem-
blée constituante was a noticeable – if not very encouraging – exception. It cannot be excluded 
that a larger part of the citizenry will listen to arguments about the Convention’s work after the 
IGC, as was the case with the debates generated by the Maastricht Treaty in France and Denmark, 
or by the Nice Treaty in Ireland. Advocates of public deliberation warn that “[The] success of 
public deliberation should be measured reconstructively – that is in light of the historical devel-
opment of democratic institutions and practices.”
31 In the short term, the impact of deliberation 
on public opinion is probably very limited. In the long term, it may play some role in the forma-
tion of a common civic culture. After the Convention, two classic sets of criticisms will lose their 
appeal. First, the argument of those who criticized the treaties because they had been negotiated 
in closed and restricted forums of diplomats, will not be valid any more. Secondly, those non-
founding members who had long criticized the EU, and its institutions, arguing that they had had 
to accept the whole package when they became members, despite the fact that they disagreed 
with some aspects of the treaties, will have to acknowledge that they have now taken part in a 
broad debate, where everything was on the table. If they support the new treaty, this will amount 
to a confirmation of their acceptance. Whatever might be the result of the Convention, it will re-
flect the average vision of the ordinary European ruling class, not just a suboptimal compromise 
reached at the end of the night by fifteen exhausted ministers. In other words, the composition of 
the Convention – even if its members were not directly elected to write a “constitution” – gives 
some legitimacy to its outcome. The text will be read as a compromise between the dominant 
visions of European representatives at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Its status might be 
compared to that of the Federalist Papers, read by generations of politicians, constitutional 
judges, lawyers and students, and often used as a reference to interpret the U.S. constitution.
32 
Since the interpretation of the founding fathers – “la volonté du constituant” in French – is an im-
portant element of the Western legal culture,
33 the records of this deliberation might become, in 
the long term, a key to interpreting the European constitutional treaty in political and judicial 
fora; as such, they would be an element of these “conceptual resources” that Rawls presents as a 
                                                           
31 Bohman 1996: 241 
32 Though, in this case, the argument on the deliberation by some of its actors was more important than the 
deliberation itself. 
33 Sunstein 2001.   17
necessary condition of any “overlapping consensus.”
34 But this is only one of the three conditions 
laid down by Rawls to forge a “constitutional consensus” that could evolve towards an “overlap-
ping consensus.” Once we turn to the other two conditions, the analysis becomes ever more hypo-
thetical and pessimistic. 
 
III.  The outcome : Tocquevillean fatalism 
Rawls concedes that the “constitutional consensus” might be the reality of contemporary de-
mocracies, but he still finds this kind of agreement too weak to build a “well-ordered democratic 
society.” An overlapping consensus not only requires “conceptual resources” to understand and 
interpret the basic principles, it also needs fundamental legislation implementing the basic rights 
and freedoms – including measures to guarantee the citizen’s basic needs – and a loyalty to the 
basic principles, together with a sense of mutual trust, independent from the comprehensive doc-
trines of the citizens.  
Is the Convention likely to reach an agreement that could be defined as an overlapping con-
sensus? It is certainly too early to answer this question, since the Convention has not reached 
comprehensive compromises yet. But some elements of the emerging consensus – in the debates 
of the plenary and the reports of the working groups – tend to show that the conventionnels will 
be content with a modest “constitutional consensus.” 
First, the debate on the EU’s policies has confirmed that a quasi-unanimity of the members 
want to clarify the delineation of competencies between the Union and the member states rather 
than alter it. If the suggestion to suppress the pillars, and to apply a simplified decision-making 
procedure based on co-decision and QMV across all policy areas were accepted, this could 
amount to “more Europe” in some fields – notably the coordination of internal security policies. 
But, so far, only a very tiny minority of the conventionnels suggest strengthening the financial re-
sources of the EU, so that it could develop larger redistributive policies. The working group on 
“social Europe” produced a consensual report based on the argument that the EU’s competence in 
this field is “adequate.” This means that the EU might be used more frequently as a regulatory 
power, or to coordinate national policies, but it is very unlikely to complement the action of na-
tional governments in welfare policies.  
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The consequences of this agreement in terms of democratic legitimacy are ambivalent. On the 
one hand, those who see the EU as a “regulatory power” which does not interfere with the func-
tions of the national welfare states might be satisfied by this clarification. The EU will not itself 
pass and implement legislation guaranteeing a “certain level of material and social welfare, 
formation and education”
35  without which people can not participate as citizens. But it does not 
prevent member states from passing such legislation, if the impact of European norms of compe-
tition on social policies is limited, and if the competition between national regimes is softened 
through flexible coordination.
36 In a multi-level polity, all the conditions of a “well-ordered soci-
ety” must not necessarily be dealt with at the highest level.  
Two objections, however, can be raised against this argument. First, if the EU does not deliver 
policies related to the citizen’s highest expectations, it will remain an abstract level of power. In 
the absence of mechanisms of interpersonal and international solidarity, a communitarian critique 
would argue, the sense of belonging will remain weak and the sense of trust fragile. The “republi-
can” critique of liberal constitutionalism is notably based on the belief that citizens cannot adhere 
to political principles detached from a thick identity, which itself requires elements of solidarity 
between social groups.
37 Secondly, in the absence of fiscal and social policies, it remains difficult 
to politicize European issues.
38 This, in turn, implies that citizens will not be encouraged to par-
ticipate in EU politics,
39 and that the political principles will remain poorly rooted in their percep-
tions because they will not be “personally experienced.” 
The Convention does not seem to be willing to transform the procedures and institutional bal-
ances of the EU either. The permanent opposition between the partisans of a primarily intergov-
ernmental Union and the advocates of the mixed Community model is likely to lead to an “im-
proved status quo.” If the Franco-German “compromise” supporting a dual presidency were ac-
cepted, it would strengthen the duality of the Union, and probably deepen the conflict between 
the two sources of legitimacy embodied by the Council and the Commission. But even if a more 
integrative compromise could be reached – such as a double-hatted Presidency, invested by the 
European Council and the EP, and chairing the Council and the Commission – it would not fun-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Convention, several members have asked for the incoporation of these ‘explanations’ in the new treaty. This 
illustrates the impact of deliberation, and its ‘rational outcome’ to build and strengthen consensus.  
35 Rawls 1993: IV, § 6,3 
36 Scharpf 1998 
37 Habermas 2001 
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damentally alter the institutional balance. Such a President would still be condemned to form ad 
hoc and complex coalitions of interests in the Council and the EP. The EU would remain, in other 
words, a “power-sharing” democracy, characterized by a deep division of the ‘‘society’’ and a 
strong ethos of consensus. 
40 
Limited to a regulatory power and a framework of coordination, and remaining a complex in-
stitutional system based on variable coalitions, the EU is likely to be perceived as an abstract and 
remote level of power. This, Tocqueville argued, is the fate of federalism: 
 
 L’Union est un corps immense qui offre au patriotisme un objet vague à em-
brasser. L’Etat a des formes arrêtées et des bornes circonscrites; il représente 
un certain nombre de choses connues et chères à ceux qui l’habitent. Il se con-
fond avec l’image même du sol, s’identifie à la propriété, à la famille, aux 
souvenirs du passé, aux travaux du présent, aux rêves de l’avenir. Le patri-
otisme, qui le plus souvent n’est qu’une extension de l’égoïsme individuel, est 
donc resté dans l’Etat et n’a pour ainsi dire point passé à l’Union. Ainsi les 
intérêts, les habitudes, les sentiments se réunissent pour concentrer la véritable 
vie politique dans l’Etat, et non dans l’Union .
41 
 
Coming back to George W. Bush’s USA, Tocqueville would probably recognize that he had 
underestimated the force of the Union. Looking at the EU, we should not proclaim the end of his-
tory too fast. In the long term, the perspective of a centralization of power and of a clearer polari-
zation of issues – two elements of a liberal democracy generally considered by political scientists 
as vectors of civic consciousness
42  – cannot be excluded. The “regulatory” issues are not im-
mune to conflicts. The European party federations already have different visions of how the 
single market should be regulated, and these divisions do not substantially differ from the classic 
European left-right cleavage. Questions related to internal security – and freedoms – generate a 
form of political polarization which also follows the lines of the left-right opposition. Political 
practice could strengthen these reference points and simplify the “political offer.” In parallel, the 
generalization of codecision in legislative areas could clarify the function of the Commission vis-
à-vis the EP and the Council. A German-like evolution remains theoretically possible in the long 
term. These, however, are fragile prospects. In the foreseeable future, the EU is likely to remain a 
form of “deliberative polyarchy.”
43 As such, it can be seen as a satisfying democratic polity by 
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those who share the assumptions of a strictly liberal democracy. But those who support a more 
ambitious version of democracy – which does not renounce the Millian ideal of civic education – 
will continue to criticize its lack of ambition .
44  
 
IV.  Some (provisional) conclusions 
 
These two debates – on distributive justice and on civic participation – do not necessarily un-
dermine the EU’s democratic legitimacy. The existence of a permanent discussion on the consti-
tutional principles is often seen as an essential element of any liberal democracy .
45 The question, 
in today’s Europe, is this: has the EU reached this balance between consensus and conflict on the 
foundations which is the substance of democratic legitimacy? And is the Convention likely to 
contribute to it? 
The impact of the Convention should not be overestimated. Pace the nostalgic defenders of a 
United States of Europe, the conventionnels are not likely to make a “révolution des pouvoirs,” 
and they do not contemplate a European “New Deal.” The Union of states they are trying to rede-
fine will remain very different from Westminster democracies and from European welfare states. 
Seen from a “republican’ point of view – even a moderate republicanism such as that of Haber-
mas – this Union will be unable to build “democratic legitimacy,” because it will always lack the 
comprehensive doctrines, the sense of belonging and pride that are supposed to be the founda-
tions of contemporary democracies. Citizens will not die for the Union. They will not even pay 
taxes for it. 
The contribution of the Convention should not, however, be underestimated. Analyzed through 
less exacting standards – which are probably more coherent with the preferences of largely depo-
liticized citizens – the Union might be seen as a democratically legitimate polity. The Convention 
could help strengthen this argument. First and foremost because of its method. Since it represents, 
relatively well,
46 the diversity of European opinion, and is composed of many ordinary represen-
tatives who had no clear opinion on the Union before becoming members of this assembly, and 
since all questions were on the table and discussed publicly, it will be more difficult to argue that 
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its outcome was not really accepted. The ratification of the treaty will probably be the key to the 
process. The attitude of the minority will be important here: if the most federalist and sovereignist 
minorities continue to criticize the agreement after a “consensus” – which, in Giscard’s terms 
“does not mean unanimity” – has been reached, this will undermine the text; on the other hand, if 
they acknowledge that their point of view was defeated by a very large majority, after they had 
been given the opportunity to make their point, the consensus will be strengthened. The quality of 
the deliberation, and the satisfaction it provides to its actors, might determine their attitude. The 
kind of argument used by those who will support the new treaty will be very important too. If 
they argue that “the treaty is good because it supports our interests, this will not strengthen the 
foundations of the agreement. If, on the contrary, they explain that the treaty is the best possible 
compromise between still largely different interests and visions, this might help citizens under-
stand the nature of the agreement. The legitimacy of the Union would be strengthened, not be-
cause its capacities would be developed, but because the expectations of the citizens, who would 
understand the nature of the EU better, would be reduced.  
Finally, the impact of forms should not be underestimated either. If the Convention manages to 
write a simple, clear and understandable text, the consensus might grow.
47 Western minds are 
forged by formal categories, and the conformity of the Union’s basic text to the canons of West-
ern law would make it more acceptable.
48 Giscard is probably right when he says that words mat-
ter. If the conventionnels were able to find formulas to explain that the Union is less than a state 
but more than a confederation, this could help dissipate the phantasms of those who still fear, or 
contemplate, the construction of a European state. 
The Convention is not reinventing the European Union. More modestly, its members try to re-
appraise and rephrase it. In the American history, the Constitution was the outcome of a long de-
bate on the vices and virtues of federalism and sovereignty. In the EU, the Constitution came 
first, through piecemeal instrumental arrangements and without debate. The EU is now experien-
cing this debate, ex post facto. Even if it only confirms the agreement, this might make it more 
solid.  
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